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SJ2..£'ech  by  Christo12her Tugendhat,  EEC  Commissioner  res12onsible 
fo-r:_!_he  Buc!g_~t  ~  at  the  Europetm Briefing -Conference  of  the 
Consc-:rvative  and  Unionist  Central Office,  at 11.t•5  a,m.  em 
Saturday,  1st July  1978,  in Burford Bridge Hotel,  Dorking. 
The  introduction of Direct Elections  to  the  European 
Parliament,  now  scheduled  to be  he1d  for  the first time  in June 
nex~ year,  should make  it possible significantly to  extend the 
influence of  the  pe.oples  of  the Member  States in the  Corn:munity's 
decision making.  And  if such  an extension does  indeed  take place, 
the  Coril.muni ty will,  I  believe,  be able  to  enter a  new  much  more 
dynamic  phase  of  d~velopment based upon  the foundation of much 
·public 
more  complet~trust than at present in all its institutions and 
policies. 
But  i~ is very important not  to  imagine  that there is  some 
inexorable historical or sociological  law which  guarantees  that 
once  they  are directly elected,  European HPs  will have  a  substantial 
inL  uence  upon  Community  legislation.  The  formal  powers  of  the 
European Parliament are,  in comparison with  those of 'most  of  the 
Conmmnity's  national  Parliaments, _very  limited.·  Unless,  therefore, 
the  ne'v  Parliament  con<Jucts  itself with  considerable skill and 
wisdom,  it is perfectly possible .that it will make  very little impact. 
In my  vievJ,  a  failure  by  the directly elected Parliament  to· 
realise  the high hopes  that many  have  invested in it could have  a 
very  damaging effect upon public attitudes  towards  the  Community. 
I  would "like  today  therefore  to talk about  the manner  in which  both 
the Parliament,  and  also  th~ body  of which  I  am  a  Member,  the 
European Commission,  must  behave if the Parliament's effectiveness 
is to  be maximised. 
*  *  * Avoiding  na:t:Lonal  analog.ie! 
The  410 members  of the new  Parl:iament will in,clude .people 
from many  different national backgrounds and  constitutional 
traditions,  very  few of 'whom will ~have experf:ence of the  Community's 
institutions.  In these circumst,ances it will be very difficult 
for  Euro-MPs  to identify and apply 'the approach most  likely to yiLeld 
the best results. 
One  inevitable and  immensely  dangerous  temptation for  the 
newly  elected HEPs will be  :to 'Set their sights upon acquiring  . 
powers  in relation to the Commtm..:ity 1s  other instrtutions anal 
of  the  powers  enjoyed by national Parliaments in relation to national 
governments.  Such a  cour:SH! would be entirely inappropriate and, 
almost certainly,  extremely  damaging to  the Parliament's prospects 
of  increasing its influence. 
It would be inappropriate because all the institutions of  the 
Conmtunity,  including the Parl.iament,  are quite different,  both in 
form  and  function,  f.rom  those of  the Community's national  governments 
.  '  . 
And  it would  be  damaging  to  ~he Parliament's prospects  because it 
would be  bound  to lead to  a  major constitutional collision with 
the  Council  of Ministers in which,  the  Parliament would  be  bound 
to  sustain by  far  the  severest injuries. 
The  American  Congress 
To  warn of  the  dangers  of  relyin~ too heavily on  the  .. 
analogies offered  by  their own  national Parliaments is not of 
course  to  sc.y  the HEPs  should not  try tu  learn from  the  conE ti  tutior 
expr~rience of others.  One  of  the features which \:vill  distinguish  t .• 
directly elected Parliament  from most of its national counterparts 
within the  Cornmu.ni ty is its lack of  the  power  to  form  governments. - 3  -
This  is a  characteristic which it will  share,  however,  with  the 
American  Congress;  and in my  view  the Parliament would  be well 
advised  closely to  examine  how  Congress  has  acquired its very 
.formidable position within the Arner!.i.can  political  system.  For 
althbugh it is true  that Congress  enjoys. legislative powers  that 
the directly elected Parliament will lack~ another major 
source  of its influence has  been  the use of its cornrnittee  system 
systematically and relentlessly to  demand  from  the  executives 
detailed explanations  and  justifications - very often in public 
session - of  every aspect of federal  policy. 
There  can be  no  doubt whateyer  that  the  knowledge  that 
they will have  to  explain and defend  their actions  before 
Congressional  Committees  has  a  very  substantial and  salutary 
effect upon  the  actions  of American Governments.  And  I  am  convinced 
that if the  European Parliament follows  Congress'  example  and 
concentrates its energies  primarily upon ensuring that the  Council 
of Ministers  and  the  European  Commission have  to·provide  the fullest 
possible  justification for their behaviour before both its 
specialist con1mittees  and its meetings  in plenary session,  then it 
will be  able to wield  much  greater influence  than its limited 
legal  pm-vers  might  suggest is likely  • 
. . 
./. - 4  -
As  you will  know,  the Council  of Ministers  (represented by 
the  Presidency)  and  the  Commission already appear before Parliament. 
But  because  nominated MEPs  also have  burdensome duties in their 
O\ID ·national Parliaments,  they  sirnply  do  not have  the  time  - not 
least the  time  for preparatory research - to make  the most  of  the 
opporturlities  which  such appearances  ought  to offer for eliciting 
information by  means  of  searching and persistent questioning.  One 
of  the main advantages of direct elections is that most  directly 
elected MEPs  will not be members  of national Parliaments  and will 
not,  therefore,  be similarly constrained. 
Another  feature of  the present Parliament which  somewhat 
blunts its effectiveness is its habit of holding  n~st 
of its committee meetings in private.  I  believe that the  dirP-ctly 
elected Parliament  should expose its committee  sessions much  more 
often than its predecessor  to  the public gaze;  for in  the nature 
of  things  the wider the audience  tl;le  more  anxious will be  those who 
have  to  appear before the  committees adequately  to  account for 
their  actions~/-It has  sometimes  been argued  that unless Parliament's 
,. 
committees meet  in private the  Conu11ission  and  the  Council will 
become  111Uch  less willing than at present. to  speak to MEPs  frankly. 
I  accept  that  there may  be  a  very  few  areas  of  policy where  this 
is true,  and  theref~re I  am  not arguing  that all  committee meetings 
should be open.  But  generally  speaking, Ministers  and  Commissioners 
are  surely likely to find it less, not more,  easy  to  justify a 
refusal  to disclose information if that refusal is likely to be 
\videly  knmvn. - 5  -
The  need  for Parliament  to  s12eak  with  a  coherent voice 
The  efficacy of  the  approach  I  am  recommending v7ill  be 
severely impaired,  however,  if directly elected MPs  fail  to 
recognise  another essential precondition of  the  successful 
exercise of  influence by  a  body  armed with only  lirnited legal 
sanctions  - namely,  the  possession of  a  coherent collective 
voice.  The  need  to  justify themselves  before Parliament is 
not  likely to weigh  he•=•vily  upon Ministers or Com-nissioners, 
nor  to modify  their policies, if the Parliament is  knor.~111  to  be 
riven by  a  welter of conflicting factional  or national viewpoints  -
not least because in that event Parliament  i~ likely to enjoy 
very  ~ittle r~spect with  ~he European public which it is supposed 
to represent.  Obviously,  th~ European_Parliament  cannot and  should 
not  aspire  to  achieve unanimity on every issue - if it did it would 
be  a  very dull  place  indeed  - but it will only make  a  substantial 
clear 
impact if a/majority of its members  are identified with  a  well-
defined  and  consistent view of how  the  Community  should develop 
and  of  the policies  wh~ch it should pursue. 
A change which would greatly facilitate,  though it would not 
guarantee,  the  emC'!rgence  of  such  a  majority would  be  a  reduction 
in the  number of political groups  at present sitting separately 
from  each other in the  European Parliament and  the  emergence of  a 
better organised party  system. 
. I. - 6  -
This  is  something which  should z:specially  co,ncern 
Conservatives.  For while  the different national So,cialist 
parties in the  European Parliament"  including the British Labour 
Party,  have  succeeded in merging  themselves  into a  single, if 
sometimes  rather undisciplined>  political entity,  the  parties 
of  the Centre Right are still split between  three separate groups: 
the European People.fs Party,  comprising  the  Community's  main 
Christian Democratic Parties;  the  European Progressive Democrats, 
comprising  the Gaullists and Ireland's Fianna Fail Party;  and 
the  European  Consc-:rvative Party,  an allianc·e of British and Danish 
Conservatives._IThis  lack of unity has unquestionably substantially 
weakened  the  cA-pacity of  the  Centre Right parties in the European 
Parliament  to resist the influence of the Socialists.  I  therefore 
very much  welcome  the recent creation of  the  European.De~~cratic 
Union,  an organisation bringing together  a  number  of  Centre Right 
parties inside  the  Comnunity  - including the  German  Christian 
Democrats,  the  Gaullists  and the British Conservatives  - with a 
number  of  smaller parties <)utside  - including the  Swedish and 
Nonvegian Conservatives  and  the Austrian Peoples'  Party.  The  EDU 
provides  the  frame~v-ork within which we  can,  and must,  establish 
the much  closer links upon which  the defence  of  our  conrrnon  values 
depends. 
. I. - 7  -
Relations  between  Parliament  and  the  Commission. 
One  vital determinant of  the  success  or failure of  the 
Parliament Hill  be  the  nature of its relationship with  the  European 
·Commission.  The  Founding Fathers of  the  Community  assumed  that over 
a  period of  time  the  European  Commission would  emerge  as  the most 
powerful  of  the  Comuunity's  institutions.  They  therefore  supposed 
that checking  and  influencing  the  Commission would  be  the 
Parliament's main  task;  and  to help it to fulfil  that task they 
gave  the  Parliament ·what is by  far  the most  important of its formal 
dismiss 
legal  po-.;v-ers  - its right to  I  the  entire Commission  by  means  of 
a  motion of  censure  supported by  a  two-third majority of  those 
voting. 
In the  event,  however,  the institutions of  the  Community 
have  evolved in a  manner very different from  that -.;vhich  the Founding 
Fathers  envisaged.  Most  notably,  the  Council  of Ministers has 
acquired  an unexpected  and decisive  superiority over  the other 
institutions which,  for better or worse, it seems  unlikely  to  lose 
in the  foreseeable  future. 
Naturally and  inevitably Ministers in Council  tend  to  think 
primarily in terms  of  their respective national responsibilities. 
The  Com"'Tlission's  role on  the other hand is  to  expound  and  defend  the 
Corrnnunity  interest.  And  if expe.rience. of  the  existing European 
Parliament is a  guide it seems  likely that its directly elected 
successor will.also think mainly in supra-national  terms • 
. . 
o/o - 8  -
Assuming  that this is so,.  both the ParliAment  and  the 
Commission will have  a  substantial interest in forming  a  close and 
constructive working relationship with each other in order  to 
maximise  the pressure that they  can bring to bear upon  the Council. 
But  if they  are  to  succeed in working together as  partners it will 
be  necessary for  each to act appropriately  totvards  the other. 
On  their  sid~,.  the directly elected MEPs  'vill obviously have 
to  take  great  care  to avoid seeking confrontation  with  the  Conu:nission 
merely  for its m.vn  sake. 
Meamvhile,  for its part,  the Commission will have  to  m~ke 
0-v~ry effort to  deir:onstrate  that it holds  the Parliament in high 
.  . 
respect.  The  Commission  takes  the  existing Parliament very  seriously 
and relations between the  two  bodies  are generaLwspeaking,  very 
satisfactory.  But it -v;rould  be  a  mistake for  the  Cormnission  to 
assume  that it can take  the good will of  the directly elected 
Parliament for granted.  In that context,  I  would  like briefly to 
mention  a  possible modification tQ  the  Commissio:n's  structure Hhich 
has  sometimes  been suggested as  a  necessary  accompaniment  to  the 
Community's  enlargement  to  include  Greec~, Spain and  Portugal, 
but which,  in my  view,  might have  l.~.armful  repercussions upon  the 
Commission's  relations with  the ·Parli..ament"  I  refer to  the 
proposal  that the  larger Member  States  should in the future  provide 
only  one,  and  not  as at present,  two  Commission Members. 
. I. - 9  -
The  reasoning behind this proposal is that if the  principle 
of  two  Commissioners  from  the  larger Member  States is maintained, 
the  present  Commission of  13 Members  will.have,  on  the  accession 
of  the applicant  countries,  to  be  increased to 17,  (1  each for 
Greece  and  Portugal  and  2  for Spain)  and_that  an increase of  this 
order \vill  reduce  the  Comrrission' s efficiency. 
What  is forgotten,  however,  is that even if the  F;u.r·opcan 
Comnission is never entrusted with  new  tasks  - which  seems  unlikely 
the duties it alrea(ly has will,  in an enlarged Community,  become 
very much  more  complex  and  demanding.  This will place greater 
burdens  upon individual  Corrnnissio~ers in their area of responsibility 
and  also upon  the  Commission collectively. 
Moreover,  there will. also be  an  increase in the  geographical 
area over which  Commissioners  in the  course of their duties  are 
obliged  to  travel.  Yet  travelling in a  Community  of nine countries 
already stretches  to  the  limit the resources  of thirteen 
Commissioners. 
My  fear is that if the  Commission's  numbers  are restricted 
at a  time  when  the  demands  made  upon it are increased this will 
inevitably place  strains upon  the  relati~nship between  the 
Commission and  Parliament because  Corrnnissioners  "tvill  be unable 
successfully  to  combine  the conflicting demands  of running their 
departments  in Brussels,  dealing "l.vith  Member  States in national 
capitals and  elsewhere,  anq,attending properly  to Parliamentary 
matters. 
./. In passing.,  I  would also l.ike to  draw your attention to 
a  different set of objeetions to  changin,g the basis upon which 
the  Commission is selected..  The  Founding Ferthers  envisaged that 
.. , 
the  Commission would be  a  political body.  To  help give it 
political credibility  2  the "Treaty  endowed  the Cornmission,  which 
takes  its decisions  by majority vote, with  a  •composition designed 
broadly  speaking  to reflect the  p~litical weight of  the Member  States. 
It is  not unreasonable  to  suppose  that some  at least outside  the 
Commission who  wish to .change  the basis on which it is chosen hope 
to use  the  pretext of concern for the  Conunission' s  efficiency . 
covertly  to  reduce its political authority.  Yet it seems  to me  that 
the need  for a  political Commission is  just as great in 1978  as it 
was  in 1957.  And  even if others disagree, it would surely be  ~vrong 
·  narrowly 
to make  a  major  change of this kincl ostensibly on/administrative 
grounds  without full and open consideration of  the wider  implications~ 
Bolder eroposals 
Returning  to  the issue of the relations between the  Commission 
and  the Parliament,  th.e  Commission \dll of  course have  to  do  more, 
.  . 
if it is to  enter a  constructive partnership with  the Parliament, 
than devote  adequate  time to Parliamentary matters.  It will also · 
have  to  ensure  that wherever possible its own  proposals  are in 
harmony  with Parliament 
1 s  vievJS. 
. I . - 11  -
One  of  the  permanent  dilerrrmas  v1hich  the  Commission faces 
when  preparing measures  for  submission to  the  Council  is whether 
to  propose  the far reaching  schemes  for developing  the  Community 
which it would  ideally like  to  see  - and for which  the Parliament 
is very often pressing  - or whether instead to  advance much  more 
modest  proposals of a  kind more  likely  to  be  palatable  to  national 
governments.  Usually  the  Corrroission  chooses  the latter course 
because it not unre.asonably  fears  that if it asks  the  Council  for 
too much  it may  end up receiving assent  to nothing at all.  A 
directly elected Parliament,  however,  is likely  to  press  the 
very hard 
Commission/to  take  a  much  bolder line and  i·n  my  view  the  Corr.rnission 
would  be  ill~advised always  to refuse  to  do  so. 
Yet if the  Comnission proposes  bolder measures  how  is it 
going  to  avoid  provoking stiffer resistance in .the  Council?  I  can 
see  no  easy  solution to  this difficulty.  It is to  be hoped of 
course  that the directly elected  P~rliament will itself exert 
pressure upon  the Council  to react more  constructively to  the 
Comnission's  proposals.  But  such-pressure on its own  is unlikely 
to  be  sufficient-for the  purpose.  I  am  therefore increasingly 
convinced  that  the  C01mnission will have  to revise its own  approach 
to  the  task of  persuading national  governments  to  pursue  European 
objectives. 
./. -u-
At  present the cOcmrmission  C<l>ncentrat:es  mainly  though  by  no 
means  exclusively upon :!l.lttempting  to  itlllfllllllence  govemments  by  mea·c1s 
of  private discussie>ns ,wiltJJn  national. Jf.d:nisiters  and  thein: officials 
behiRd closed doors.  'lhis is ,a  vital task·:whi.ch  t:m.il:Slt  not be 
abandoned.  But if the COll'lii.li.:s:siLon is to have  any hope  of winning  the 
as sent for  the  more adventurous :p'l:GpG'!kals  :which  are. likely to  be  the 
consequence  of direct <el.;ections,,  i.f it is to persuade national 
Hinisters  to discard :the  bl.i~kers llihidh  tht.')'  too often wear when 
they  survey  the  Communi<t:y  s·cene,.  ~en  :Commissioners will also have  to 
be ·much  more  prepared than at 1 pre:sent  to step 
outside  the  corridors  of  pG\~eT and'robustly to enter the  arena of 
public  debate.-
In  the  final  analysis' the conduct of  the  Cormnunity 1 s  national 
governnK:.nts  is largely determined  by ·their perception of  the atti  tucL 
and  expectations of  the national electorates to which they are 
responsible.  What  the ·:Commission mus-t  try to do,  therefore,  is to 
explain to  those  elc;citarates directly_,  by all the  appropriate methods 
available  to  them,  the· ·sl..ithstantial_ concrete benef_i ts which  Community 
action can bring  them.  they  ll'lUS t  try to  persuade national 
electorates  themselves  to bring pressure  ~n national  governments  to 
make  proper use of  the opportunities which  the  Community offers  them. 
This  of  course is  a  political task requiring political skills. 
But  then,  as  I  said earlier,  the  Conwrrission is,  and  should remain, 
a  political body. 